Sri Aurobindo
Autobiographical Notes
and Other Writings of Historical Interest
Part Two. Letters of Historical Interest
1. Letters on Personal, Practical and Political Matters
(1890–1926)
Letters and Telegrams to Political and Professional
Associates 1906–1926
To Motilal Roy [17]1
29 August 1914
Dear M.
Before your letter came, ie yesterday, the news was
published that the Government had drawn back from its proposal, and today the
Amrita [Bazar]2 with its comment arrived. I presume,
therefore, no immediate answer from me is needed. But in case anything of the
kind is raised again, I shall give you my opinion in the matter.
We gain nothing by preaching an unconditional loyalty
to the Government, such as is the fashion nowadays, or doing anything which even
in appearance strengthens the disposition towards an abject and unmanly tone in
politics. Gandhi’s loyalism is not a pattern for India which is not South
Africa, and even Gandhi’s loyalism is corrected by passive resistance. An abject
tone of servility in politics is not “diplomacy” and is not good politics. It
does not deceive or disarm the opponent; it does encourage nervelessness, fear
and a cringing cunning in the subject people. What Gandhi has been attempting in
S. Africa is to secure for Indians the position of kindly treated serfs,– as a 
stepping-stone to something better. Loyalty + Ambulance Corps mean
the same thing in India. But the conditions of India are not those of S. Africa;
our position is different and our aim is different, not to secure a few
privileges, but to create a nation of men fit for independence and able to
secure and keep it. We have been beaten in the first attempt, like every other
nation similarly circumstanced. That is no reason why the whole people should go
back to a condition of abject fear, grovelling loyalty and whining complaints.
The public Nationalist policy has always been
1. Eventual independence
2. No cooperation without control.
3 A masculine courage in speech and action
Let us add a fourth,
4. Readiness to accept real concessions and pay their
just price, but no more. Beyond that, I do not see the necessity of any change.
We recognise that immediate independence is not practicable and we are ready to
defend the British rule against any foreign nation, for that means defending our
own future independence.
Therefore, if the Government accepts volunteers or
favours the institution of Boy-Scouts, we give our aid, but not to be mere
stretcher-bearers.
That is the side of principle; now let us look at that
of policy.
(1) I don’t appreciate Sarat Maharaj’s position. If
self-sacrifice is the object, every human being has the whole of life as a field
for self-sacrifice and does not depend on any Government for that. We can show
our sacrificing activities every moment, if we want. It is not a question of
sacrifice at all, it is a question of military training. If the young men wish
to organise for charitable work, the Government is not going to stop it, even
though they may watch and suspect. I put that aside altogether.
(2) The leaders suggested cooperation in return for
some substantial self-government. They are now offering cooperation without any
return at all. Very self-sacrificing, but not political. If indeed, Govt were
willing to train “thousands of young men” in military service as volunteers,
Territorials or boy-scouts, whether for keeping the peace or as a reserve in
case of invasion, then we 
need not boggle about
the return. But, after so much experience, do these addle-headed politicians
think the Govt is going to do that except
in case of absolute necessity and as a choice between two evils? When will that
absolute necessity come? Only if the war goes against them seriously and they
have to withdraw their troops from India. I shall discuss that point later on.
(3) Meanwhile what have the Government done? After
testing the temper of the people and , you may be sure, watching closely what
young men came forward as volunteers and who did not, they have removed an offer
which had already been whittled down to a mere harmless Ambulance Corps in which
the young men have plenty of chances of getting killed, but none of learning
real warfare. Mere common sense warns us not to trust such an administration and
to think ten times before accepting its offers. We know Lord Hardinge’s policy;
(1) sweet words, (2) quiet systematic coercion, (3) concession where obstinacy
would mean too great a row and too much creation of deep-seated hostility.
Having prefaced so much, let us look at the utility of
the things offered us or offered by us.
1. Ambulance Corps –
The only possible utilities would be two, (1) to train
two thousand young men to be steady under fire (2) to train them to act together
under discipline in an easy but dangerous service. Now it is quite possible for
us to create courage in our young men without these means, and I hope our best
men, or let me say, our men generally do not need to become stretcher bearers in
a European war in order to have the necessary nerve, courage, steadiness and
discipline. If therefore an Ambulance Corps is again suggested and accepted,
either refuse or let only those young men go who are enthusiastic, but still
lightheaded, self-indulgent or undisciplined. Possibly, the experience may
steady and discipline them. It may be necessary to let this be done, if the
circumstances are such that to refuse entirely would reflect on our national
courage or be interpreted as a backing out from a national engagement.
2. Boy-Scouts – Volunteer Corps – Territorials.
All these are entirely good, provided the police are
kept at 
a distance, and provided officers as
well as men are trained and the Govt
control is limited to the giving of military discipline in the first two cases.
Even without the second proviso, any of these things would be worth accepting.
Only in the case of volunteers going to the scene of
war, you must see that we are not crippled by all our best men or even a
majority being sent; only enough to bring in an element among us who have seen
actual warfare –
. . . . . . . . .
I think any of these things may one day become
possible. Since the last year, new forces have come into the world and are now
strong enough to act, which are likely to alter the whole face of the world. The
present war is only a beginning not the end. We have to consider what are our
chances and what we ought to do in these circumstances.
The war is open to a certain number of broad chances.
I. Those bringing about the destruction of the two
Teutonic empires, German and Austrian.
This may happen either by an immediate German defeat,
its armies being broken and chased back from Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine to
Berlin, which is not probable, or by the Russian arrival at Berlin and a
successful French stand near Rheims or Compiègne, or by the entry of Italy and
the remaining Balkan states into the war and the invasion of Austro-Hungary from
two sides.
II Those bringing about the weakening or isolation of
the British power.
This may be done by the Germans destroying the British
expeditionary force, entering Paris and dictating terms to France while Russia
is checked in its march to Berlin by a strong Austro-German force operating in
the German quadrilateral between the forts of Danzig, Thorn, Posen and
Königsberg. If this happens Russia may possibly enter into a compact with
Germany based on a reconciliation of the three Empires and a reversion to the
old idea of a simultaneous attack on England and a division of her Empire
between Germany and Russia.
III. Those bringing
about the destruction of British power.
This may happen by the shattering of the British fleet
and a German landing in England.
In either of the two last cases an invasion of India by
Germany, Russia or Japan is only a question of time, and England will be unable
to resist except by one of three means.
(1) universal conscription in England and the Colonies
(2) the aid of Japan or some other foreign power
(3) the aid of the Indian people.
The first is useless for the defence of India, in case
III, and can only be applied in case II, if England is still mistress of the
seas. The second is dangerous to England herself, since the ally who helps, may
also covet. The third means the concession of self-government to India.
In case I, there will only remain four considerable
powers in Europe and Asia, Russia, France, England, Japan – with perhaps a
Balkan Confederacy or Empire as a fifth. That means as the next stage a struggle
between England and Russia in Asia. There again England is reduced to one of the
three alternatives or a combination of them.
Of course, the war may take different turns from the
above, with slightly altered circumstances and results; the one thing that is
impossible, is that it should leave the world as it was before. In any case, the
question of India must rise at no very long date. If England adopts more or less
grudgingly the third alternative, our opportunity arrives and we must be ready
to take it – on this basis, continuance of British rule and cooperation until we
are strong enough to stand by ourselves. If not, we must still decide how we are
to prepare ourselves, so as not to pass from one foreign domination to a worse.
I want those of you who have the capacity, to consider
the situation as I have described it, to think over it, enlarging our old views
which are no longer sufficient, and accustom yourselves to act always with these
new and larger conceptions in your minds. I shall write nothing myself about my
views, just as yet, as that might prevent you from thinking yourselves.
Only, two things you will see obviously from it, first,
the necessity of seizing on any opportunity
that arises of organisation or military training (not self-sacrificing charity,
that has already been done); secondly, the necessity of creating an organisation
and finding the means, if no opportunity presents itself. It will be necessary
for someone from Bengal to come and see me before long, but that will probably
not be till October or later.
I shall write to you before long farther on the
subject, as also on other matters.
K.